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Harnad, S. (2003b) Categorical Perception . Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science . Nature Publishing Group. Macmillan. http://www.youtube.com...
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(10a. Comment Overflow) (50+)
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Psychology PSYC 538, Winter 2018: Categorization, Communication and Consciousness Time : Tuesdays 2:35-5:25 Place : STBIO S3/3 ...
Regarding this article, I find it quite interesting, especially when he claims that it does not matter and is irrelevant whether ‘’mental functions are neutrally localized.’’ I do not think that a mental process can be localized solely in one part of the brain, but rather think there is significant overlap in the neural activity in the brain responsible for that function. Of course, there are certain things that have a degree of localization of function such as language (lateralization of brain function). However, I think the overlap between neural processes evident in the brain does not support this theory. For instance, according to the mass action principle, when one suffers from brain injury, the proportion of the brain that is injured is directly proportional to the reduced ability of the function of memory. This implies that it is not possible for memory to be localized to a single area in the brain, but rather is distributed across the cortex. This could be contrasted with the theory of equipotentiality that claims that when a part of the cortex suffers from damage, surrounding areas of capable of taking over the role of the damaged part. So different parts of the brain work together. No function is localized in a particular part of the brain.
ReplyDelete“But I’m a philosopher, not a neuroscientist, so perhaps I’ve badly missed the point.”
ReplyDeleteAs someone studying predominantly neuroscience, not philosophy, it surprised me how much I found myself agreeing with Fodor. I agree that no matter how well we map out the brain or localize function, we are no closer to understanding “how” we are able to do the things that we can do. Although clinically it’s great that we can locate specific neurons in specific structures, it doesn’t give us any information about how things like MNs are actually understanding that an action that someone is doing is equivalent to the one we are doing because we already knew that we could do that.
That being said, I find myself slightly disagreeing with Fodor’s last paragraph (probably due to a lack of understanding on my part). I think that those studying the brain and mapping out areas are not wasting their time, as they are still finding answers to the mystery of the brain. Although these answers are arguably the wrong type, at least there is some steady progression of knowledge and understanding that is occurring that could perhaps shed light onto the “how” question. I agree that neuroscience doesn't answer this, isn't it better than introspection? Does Fodor suggest a better path to take to find the answer?
ReplyDeleteResearch in cognitive studies requires a multifaceted approach to research. In his paper, Fodor calls for more of this field integration and states that the current position of cognitive research wastes time and money on research methods with little to no benefit. Neuroimaging is a technique often used in cognitive research that has relatively good spatial resolution but rather poor temporal resolution, only allowing us to see where things are happening in the brain and foregoing what or where it is happening. The reliance on neuroimaging in the field of cognitive science hinders researchers’ abilities to answer other possibly more interesting and important questions. Questions that ask “where” things are happening are excellent for basic science research and are an important starting point, but more work needs to be done after a part of the brain is linked with a function.
ReplyDeleteFodor argues that scientists are “wasting their time” trying to identify exactly how the brain works, but I think he forgets that humans are inherently curious creatures. Some, like him, might philosophize about how the mind works and come up with a theory of modules; others will deconstruct a computer entirely in hopes of understanding how it works. It may seem like a waste of time to him, but it has value to others.
Furthermore, I don’t agree with his separation of the views he proposes about how the brain is organized. We now know that while there are some areas that specify in some function or other and we can see upon cutting a brain open that they are anatomically different; there are also connections between those parts that allow different performances. While word processing might be done in one part of the brain, the understanding of those words is done in another and so on and so forth until a sentence is spoken out loud. I think he could have allowed for a combined theory of the two to exist, before dismissing it all as useless.
Fodor makes some compelling points in his article. I certainly agree with his point that similarity of psychology function does not necessarily predict similarity of brain locations or vice versa. However, I tend to disagree with his points about localization of neural functioning not teaching us anything about cognition. His point may be right in saying that knowing that verbs and nouns are localized in different regions may not in of itself reveal much (though I do think it could easily be argued that connectivity studies between these regions could help us to understand relationship between the regions and how this creates are sentence forming capacities). But, I think there are many important cases of how the spatial orientation of neural regions responsible for certain functions is intrinsically tied to their functioning and to our understanding of how these processes occur. Therefore, my argument will move past the question of whether our cognitive capacities are modular and into how the integration of modular functions produces our cognitive capacities. I believe that to answer this second question neuroimaging can be very powerful. To give an example, I think we can agree that it would be hard to introspect enough to parse how memory is localized in the brain. Certainly we know that certain things we can remember for long periods of time, others not so much. Further, that memory is intrinsically linked to sensory and motor processes. But, neuroimaging can be instrumental in developing our understanding of how it is that memories transition from short term representations to long term ones. Specifically, it has helped us to realize that long term memory is more so distributed throughout the cerebral cortex than localized to any one region.
ReplyDeleteIf Fodor's argument is that neuroscience imaging has little significance to the understanding of cognition, would not the Libet experiment having been verified through neuroimaging be supportive evidence of the impact that neuroimaging has for understanding topics like consciousness and volition which are tied to the weak and hard problem?
ReplyDeleteI can see Fodor’s point regarding brain imaging from a cognitive science point of view. Although there are many neuroimaging studies, the majority of them are correlational and not causational. However, I think that Fodor, being a philosopher, is so far removed from the field of neuroscience, that he is looking at this research from a different lens than the way that the researchers are.
ReplyDelete“But given that it matters to both sides whether, by and large, mental functions have characteristic places in the brain, why should it matter to either side where the places are? “
It is very useful to know where brain activity is localized for many uses, especially for clinical studies. I know that Fodor agrees with the usage of these neuroimaging techniques for clinical work, but it seems to me that he’s neglecting the fact that there is a certain amount of theoretical work that must be completed before it is possible to move into clinical work. In order to understand in which ways a stroke patient may deviate from a control individual, we first need to understand how the brain works under normal conditions. To do this, we need to study where different activities are localized in the brain. We cannot only look at brain activity localization in stroke patients and expect to get the full picture of how their brain activity has been affected by their stroke.
I enjoyed Fodor's paper, by and large because of how simple he makes his argument. He concedes the medical benefits of using neuroimaging to know where in the brain certain mental functions happen, however he (convincingly) argues that knowing this information does nothing for anyone hoping to understand the "how" of mental functions. I was interested in the question Fodor brings up about how much of the brain is innate, and what that would mean one would expect regarding the neuroimaging results of a child vs an adult. It reminded me of the first reading and the same thoughts I had while reading it! Maybe it does not exactly help in understanding the "how" question directly, but wouldn't using neuroimaging in this way help researchers know where to start looking? By this, I mean, if scientists could show that these mental functions are learned rather than innate, and this was "scientifically proven" (i.e. neuroimaging shows difference between infant and adult), wouldn't that have implications for trying to reverse engineer these functions to create a T3? Then again, this is all coming from some (perhaps misguided) idea that one could even observe or study these neural networks to such an extent to reverse engineer them - when I suppose it looks like there is more hope for setting out with a more philosophical/theoretical understanding of how these processes work and trying to create that to see if it works the same. Turing machines weren't based on neural networks being studied, they were studied based on the concept that computation is part of cognition. So, all of that ramble to say that hey, maybe even what I mentioned in favour of neuroimaging stands on shaking ground.
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ReplyDeleteI can understand some of the points Fodor makes in this article but we have to consider that it is by making even small discoveries that the future may open up for new possibilities in terms of how we understand and treat our brains. Furtermore it may have broad societal implications, although it can be argued that all implications may not be good for all of the people as future findings may effect different groups in different ways. It is also a point taken that these researches/experiments are costly burden on the taxpayers money which may not benefit them largely any time soon but in an ideal world without these restraints, we ought to find out the truth about ourselves and our world, the reason we study the brain is the same reason we go out explore space, it is our quest for knowledge and truth.
I do understand that I am very biased about brains, as all of my classes (and my entire major/future) revolve around the study of brains and progressions of research in the field. Though I understand that research is very expensive and potentially over inflated, I do still see value in continuing studies in the field. For example, the study of brain maps is beneficial in determining the functionality of each specific portion of the brain, which could aid in helping treat numerous illnesses and disorders. While it is unlikely that people will ever find the specific area to thinking about teacups, I don’t think that completely undermines the value of such work. That said, just because it is unlikely does not mean it is impossible. I think research as a field in general is very slow going, with many failures before great success. Even just in the past decade, there have been many "eureka" moments for neuroscience. All the same, I cannot disagree with some of the statements that Fodor makes. I'm sure that my response to his criticisms are things that he has heard and rebutted before. While I do believe that his theoretical, philosophical view might be too far removed from the world of neuroscience to completely glean all the value of research, his slanted view has forced some questioning of my own. I wonder to what extent I have been brainwashed to believe that the brain is the key to unlocking all the secrets of humans, and if my degree of internalization caused my course of study or was merely the byproduct of it.
ReplyDeleteHi Erin! I love this comment because you put into words all my feelings about this article. While Fodor's arguments are logical and difficult to dispute, I find myself resisting them on behalf of my field of study and the all the renumerations of the importance of neuroimaging work that I have been exposed to over the past four years.
DeleteI'm grappling here, trying to pick a side of the debate. The best argument I could settle on is that there is no "whether the brain is functionally divided" work without the "where the brain is functionally divided and for what functions" work. Since the two go hand in hand, I would assert that there is value to this type of research, as even Fodor had to allow that knowing whether the brain is heterogeneous or homogeneous may help us unlock further truths about brain function and the human condition.
I really liked Fodor’s publication. I think that in very simple words he was able ask a fundamental question that many do not stop to think about. Scientists, scholars and students spend years on the study of consciousness and one of the few things that we seem to be sure about (and not event that sure…) is that it is in the brain, or that the brain is responsible for it. Do we really need scientific proofs in order to be sure that we have a mind? Isn’t the human complexity caused by the mind, which no one can reproduce in any program or machine? Isn’t what makes us human at the end? Why do we try so hard to prove every single element of our being?
ReplyDeleteI also find interesting that the Grill-Spector’s article is in this section. Is really our capacity for organization that makes us human? Or is it there only to show that even if we know what part of the brain fires in response to a stimulus, it does not tell us much more about the reason of that activity or the way it is activated. Once again, even if we find some correlation and we thing that we answered some questions, there are 100 more questions behind that answer. We could map the whole brain, finding the position of every single neuron, I still don’t think that we will understand the origin of the mind and thinking.
I was really interested in the line Fodor drew in his article between the questions of whether mental functions are neurally localized in the brain, and the question of where they are neurally localised in the brain. Fodor argues that the only useful question here is the first one.
ReplyDeleteFodor explains that he sees a clear connection between the question of functional specialisation in the brain and arguments about the workings of the mind. He explains its relevance in the following way: if mental functions spread across the brain in a heterogeneous way, that heterogeneous division may give us insight into why we think the way we do. He makes the same case for the discovery of a homogenous working mind.
Fodor therefore accepts why scientists may be interested in proving or disproving functional specialisation. What he challenges is neuroimaging research towards the specific locations of given mental processes.
I think Fodor presents an interesting binary between the general whether and the specific where questions. I question whether one question can truly be answered without the other. Can research attempt to prove functional specialisation without citing specific examples of it? Can we learn anything of use about a heterogeneous brain without creating a functional map of it, complete with specific mental processes and there locations, assuming they have them?
While I understand Fodor's resistance to research on the localisation of particular mental processes, I don't completely agree with him about its frivolousness. I think that what Fodor calls the chance at serendipity I would call a very logical possibility of neuroimaging research: that a brain function's location can teach us more about the identity of that brain function and particularly, its connection to other, related functions. I believe that unexpected connections between mental states could sharpen our understanding of the human condition, and may lead to further research towards things like therapy, memory, and other important areas.
This article addresses the refuting battle between neuroscience and cognition. The author wants the readers to understand that neuroscience isn’t useless (since knowing what behavior is associated with which part of the brain is useful in surgeries) but doesn’t explain cognition. Instead neuroscience is very useful in the medical field as mentioned above. Since thought cannot be localized what is neuroscience’s implementation in this field. As Harnad mentioned in one of his previous writings “mental states can be physical states: It turns out they are not physical states! They are computational states”, the use of neuroscience in some parts of the cognitive field can be argued. Especially when trying to answer where thought and consciousness are localized in the brain.
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